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Abstract
In this paper, we show that behavioral features can be obtained at a group level when
the individuals of the group are heterogeneous enough. Starting from a standard model of
Pareto optimal allocations, with expected utility maximizers and exponential discounting,
but allowing for heterogeneity among individual beliefs and individual time preference rates,
we show that the representative agent has an inverse S-shaped probability distortion function
and hyperbolic discount rates. As an application of this result, we show that an agent with
a probability weighting function as in Cumulative Prospect Theory (resp. an ambiguity
averse agent, resp. an hyperbolic discounting agent) may be represented as a collection of
agents with noisy beliefs (resp. heterogeneous beliefs, resp. heterogeneous constant discount
rates).
JEL Codes : G11; D81; D84; D87; D03; H43
Keywords: behavioral agent, hyperbolic discounting, probability weighting function, rep-
resentative agent, neuronance, ambiguity aversion.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze a model of Pareto optimal allocations with von Neuman Morgenstern
utility maximizing agents and exponential discounting. Agents are heterogeneous, in the sense
Corresponding author: jouini@ceremade.dauphine.fr, +33144054226
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that they might di¤er in their beliefs and in their time preference rates. At the aggregate level,
the social welfare function of this economy is characterized by a social/representative belief and
a social/representative time preference rate. We examine these social characteristics and we
show that we retrieve, at the aggregate level, behavioral properties that have been proved to be
true at the individual level in recent literature. The group acts as a behavioral agent and these
behavioral properties at the aggregate level are generated by heterogeneity alone.
We start by introducing natural notions of optimism and pessimism and we assume that
beliefs are heterogeneous enough in order to allow for optimistic as well as pessimistic agents
in the initial set of von Neuman Morgenstern utility maximizing agents. In such a setting,
we obtain that the representative agent can neither be everywhere optimistic nor everywhere
pessimistic; she is optimistic for the good states of the world and pessimistic for the bad states
of the world. As in the SP/A Theory of Lopes (1987), the representative agent behaves as if
she had fear (need for security) for very bad events and hope (desire for potential) for very
good events. The representative agent puts more weight on extreme events. We show that the
distribution of outcomes from the representative agent point of view is portfolio dominated by
the objective distribution. This means that heterogeneity generates doubt at the aggregate level.
This e¤ect is reinforced when agents are more risk tolerant or when there is more heterogeneity
among agents.
The representative agent distorts the objective distribution of aggregate endowment. We
analyze this distortion and we show that the distortion function (dened as the transformation
of the objective decumulative distribution function into the decumulative distribution function
of the representative agent) is inverse S-shaped as is the probability weighting function in
Cumulative Prospect Theory. We show that we are able to t relatively well standard probability
weighting functions of the Cumulative Prospect Theory literature (Tversky and Kahneman,
1992, Tversky and Fox, 1995, Prelec, 1998, among others). We analyze how the distribution of
individual characteristics in the group governs the shape of the resulting representative agent
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distortion function. Following Gonzalez andWu (1999) terminology, we show that attractiveness
at the aggregate level is directly related to the average level of optimism while discriminability
is related to beliefs heterogeneity.
As far as discount rates are concerned, we obtain that the aggregate time preference rate
is decreasing, which is consistent with hyperbolic discounting. It converges to the time pref-
erence rate of the most patient individual. These properties are similar to those obtained in a
deterministic setting by Gollier-Zeckhauser (2005) and Lengwiler (2005) but are derived here
in a stochastic setting that takes into account beliefs heterogeneity.
As a main application of these results we obtain that a behavioral individual (i.e. an individ-
ual whose preferences are governed by hyperbolic discounting and who distorts the distributions
through a probability weighting function) behaves as would a group of standard heterogeneous
vNM individuals with exponential discounting. Our results can then be related to Neuroeco-
nomics. As underlined by Cohen (2005), ndings from neuroscience provide support for a view
of the brain as a confederation of systems and behavior as the outcome of an interaction among
these, (...) when disagreements arise, behavior reects the outcome of a competition among
systems. We show that a model of the brain as a central planner who, for the evaluation
of a given prospect, maximizes the social welfare of a collection of competing doers (mental
processes with heterogeneous time preference rates and noisy beliefs about the prospect under
consideration) leads to hyperbolic discounting and to probability weighting functions that have
the same shape as in the Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT). Furthermore, such a model of
individual behavior accomodates with a distinction between risk and uncertainty and exhibits,
for some values of the parameters, ambiguity aversion. In such a framework, ambiguity aversion,
inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions and hyperbolic discounting result from doers
heterogeneity.
Note that we dont pretend to retrieve all features of CPT on the aggregate belief nor all
features of the time preference rate as in e.g. Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). We only retrieve
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one of the three main features of CPT, namely the inverse S-Shaped probability distribution
weighting function (the other two being the presence of a reference point and the presence of
loss aversion). This comes from the fact that we have introduced heterogeneity on the beliefs
only, hence the behavioral property that we retrieve deals with the belief only. We also only
obtain the hyperbolicproperty of the time preference rate and not other behavioral properties
such as the di¤erent (discounting) treatment of gains and losses.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyses the
properties of the belief of the representative agent, while Section 4 analyses the properties of
the time preference rate of the representative agent. Section 5 provides possible applications.
2 The Setting
We consider an economy with a single consumption good and with agents who have the same
utility function but heterogeneous beliefs. Aggregate endowment in the consumption good is
described by a random variable e dened on a probability space (
; F; P ) : We let I denote
the set of heterogeneous agents. We assume that the common utility function is CRRA with
derivative given by u0(x) = x 
1
 . Each agent has a subjective belief Qi and wants to maximize
her von Neumann Morgenstern utility for consumption of the form Ui (c) = EQi [u (c)] : We
let M i denote the density of Qi with respect to the probability P , hence agent is utility for
consumption can equivalently be written in the form Ui (c) = E

M iu (c)

:
In such an economy, we consider the aggregate utility function U dened as the solution of
the following maximization program
U(e)  maxP
i2I yi=e
X
i2I
iE

M iu(yi)

where (i) are given positive weights. The aggregate utility function corresponds to the value
of the social welfare function at the Pareto optimum when agent i is granted a weight i by a
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social planner. The index i may also represent a group of agents with common beliefs M i and
yi then represents the total consumption of the group and i the sum of the weights granted
by the social planner to the individuals in the group. When the social planner grants the same
weight to all the agents in the economy, the weight i represents the proportion of agents that
have the same belief M i: From a social planner point of view, the aggregate utility function
corresponds to the highest social utility level among all possible endowment distributions across
agents.
The number of agents can be nite or innite. In the case of an innite number of agents,
sums are replaced by integrals. We obtain the following representation result.
Proposition 1 Representative Agent
The aggregate utility for consumption is given by
U(e) = E [Mu(e)]
with
M =
 X
i2I
i
 
M i
! 1
(1)
for i = 

i : The representative agent belief is then given by M =
 P
i2I i
 
M i
 1 .
This means that, at the Pareto optimum, the aggregate utility is given by the utility of a
representative agent endowed with an average belief (and the same utility function as each of
the agents). In particular, if all the agents share the same belief, then the representative agent
will share this common belief. If we think of e as a given prospect for the group I of agents, the
aggregate utility U(e) corresponds to the social welfare associated with the optimal allocation
of e across the members of the group and is given by the utility of the representative agent.
In the same way as the representative agent belief M is an average of the individual beliefs
M i, we show in the next corollary that the density fM of e for the representative agent is an
5
average of the densities f i of e for the di¤erent agents. For this purpose, let us assume that
for all i 2 I; the distribution of e for agent i admits a density1 (with respect to the Lebesgue
measure on the real line), denoted by f i: We also assume that the distribution of e under the
probability P admits a density and we denote it by f: Since we dont have E [M ] = 1 (except in
the specic logarithmic utility setting) we need the following technical denition. We say that
the distribution of a random variable X admits a density fX for the representative agent if
for all function h, we have E [Mh (X)] =
R
h (x) fX (x) dx: Moreover, in order to analyse the
relative weights of the di¤erent states of the world from the representative agent point of view,
we introduce the probability measure Q dened by dQdP  ME[M ] .
Corollary 2 The distribution of e admits the following density for the representative agent
fM =
 X
i2I
i
 
f i
!1=
which is a power average of the initial densities. In particular, for  = 1; the distribution of e
for the representative agent is a mixture of the individual subjective distributions.
As an immediate consequence of Corollary 2, we get that for any measurable real-valued
function '; the distribution of ' (e) admits the density fM;' =
 P
i2I i
 
f i;'
1= for the
representative agent where f i;' denotes the density of the distribution of ' (e) for agent i: This
implies in particular that in the case  = 1; if each agent anticipates a normal distribution on
log e, then the distribution of log e is a mixture of normal distributions.
1 In other words, the distribution of e under Qi is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
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3 Behavioral properties of the group
3.1 Qualitative properties
The next two simple examples illustrate the qualitative properties of the endowment distribution
from the representative agent point of view. The proofs can be found in the Appendix.
Example 1. Let us assume that all utility functions are logarithmic ( = 1): We have
EQ [e] =
X
i2I
iE
Qi [e] ;
which means that the mean at the aggregate level is given by an arithmetic average of the
individual means. The variance is given by
V arQ [e] =
X
i2I
iV ar
Qi [e] + V ari
 
EQi [e]

;
where V ari
 
EQi [e]
 Pi2I i  EQi [e]2  Pi2I iEQi [e]2 measures beliefs (on the mean)
heterogeneity. This means that the variance at the aggregate level is given not only by an
arithmetic average of the individual variances, but also by an additional term related to beliefs
dispersion. The variance is increasedat the aggregate level and this increase is proportional
to the level of beliefs heterogeneity: beliefs heterogeneity generates doubt.
Example 2. Let us assume that the objective distribution of aggregate endowment is lognormal
with e P lnN (; 2) and that we have two equally weighted groups of agents, both with
lognormal subjective distributions for aggregate endowment, e Qi lnN (i; 2) for i = 1; 2:
The distribution of log e for the representative agent is not Gaussian and when agentsbeliefs
are heterogeneous enough (j1   2j > 2p ), the distribution of log e is bimodal (see Figure 1).
When  = 1+22 ; the distribution of log e
 for the representative agent is Portfolio Dominated2
2Let us recall that a distribution f dominates a distribution g in the sense of Portfolio Dominance (f PD g)
if we have
R
u0(x)(x  a)f(x)dx = 0 =) R u0(x)(x  a)g(x)dx = 0 for any real number a and any non-decreasing
concave function u: This concept has been introduced in the context of portfolio problems by Landsberger and
Meilijson (1993) and further studied by Gollier (1997). It characterizes the changes in the distribution of the
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by the objective distribution. Hence, aggregate endowment e is considered as more risky by
the representative agent than it actually is. In particular, we have V arQ [log e] > V arP [log e].
This last property still holds for general (i). Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these conclusions in
di¤erent settings. Note that Figure 1 is similar to Figure 8.2 in Shefrin (2005). For  > 0 and
associated representative agent probability measures Q and Q
0
; we have dQ

dQ0
= h;0(e
) where
h;0 is symmetric with respect to
1+2
2 , decreasing before
1+2
2 and increasing after
1+2
2 .
A higher level of risk tolerance induces then a portfolio dominated shift in the representative
agents distribution. In particular, V arQ [log e] increases with the level or risk tolerance :
The interpretation is the following. When there is heterogeneity, each agent consumes a larger
proportion of aggregate endowment in states of the world that she considers more likely. This
leads to heterogeneous allocations and generates variance at the aggregate level. However, this
e¤ect is counterbalanced by risk aversion. Consequently, the higher the level of risk tolerance,
the more heterogeneous the members of the group are in their optimal allocations. Figure 2
illustrates this result.
For normal distributions N (i; 2), there is a natural order on the set of possible densities
induced by the natural order on the means (i). Agents with a larger (resp. smaller) i can
be referred to as more optimistic (resp. pessimistic). We generalize these notions of relative
pessimism/optimism in the following denition. If we assume that P is the objective probability,
then we are also able to introduce absolute notions of pessimism/optimism.
Denition 1 For i; j 2 I; agent i is said to be more optimistic than agent j and we denote it by
fi <opt fj if and only if fifj is nondecreasing. The optimism relation <opt is an order on the set
(fi)i2I : If P is the objective probability, then agent i is said to be optimistic (resp. pessimistic)
if fif is nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing).
Denition 1 can be rephrased in terms of Monotone Likelihood Ratio Dominance (MLR)3
returns of the risky asset that lead to an increase in demand for the risky asset irrespective of the risk-free rate.
It is then related to the degree of riskiness. See also Jouini and Napp (2008).
3This concept is widely used in the statistical literature and was rst introduced in the context of portfolio
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: agent i is more optimistic than agent j if the distribution of e for agent i (i.e., under Qi)
dominates the distribution of e for agent j (i.e., under Qj) in the sense of the MLR. For a
given agent i; if we let gi denote the transformation of the objective decumulative distribution
function F into the agents subjective decumulative distribution function Fi, i.e. such that
Fi = gi  F; it is easy to check that fif is nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing) if and only if gi is
convex (resp. concave). This means that our concept of optimism/pessimism is the analog, in
the expected utility framework, of the concept of optimism/pessimism introduced by Diecidue
and Wakker (2001) in a RDEU framework. Other concepts of optimism/pessimism have been
proposed in the literature. In particular, Yaari (1987), Chateauneuf and Cohen (1994) and Abel
(2002) propose a denition based on First Stochastic Dominance 4. Note that MLR dominance
is stronger than FSD.
A MLR dominated shift for a given distribution reduces the mean and if fi <opt fj then
we have EQi [e]  EQj [e]. This last condition characterizes the MLR dominance when we
restrict our attention to a family of lognormal distributions with the same variance parameter
and we then retrieve that agent i is more optimistic than agent j if and only if i > j : In that
case, optimistic (resp. pessimistic) agents are then characterized by i >  (resp. i < ) as in
Shefrin (2005).
Proposition 3 We suppose that there are at least one optimistic agent denoted by fopt and
one pessimistic agent denoted by fpess in the set I of agents: We also assume that lim+1
fopt
f =
lim 1
fpess
f = +1 and lim 1 foptf = lim+1 fpessf = 0:
1. The representative agent can neither be optimistic, nor pessimistic, i.e. fMf is non monotone.
2. The representative agent overestimates the weight of the good states of the world (high
problems by Landsberger and Meilijson (1990). More precisely, Landsberger and Meilijson (1990) showed that in
the standard portfolio problem a MLR shift in the distribution of returns of the risky asset leads to an increase
in demand for the risky asset for all agents with nondecreasing utilities.
4More precisely, in an expected utility framework Abel (2002) denes pessimism by the condition Fi  F
(First Stochastic Dominance) that corresponds to the condition gi  Id introduced by Chateauneuf and Cohen
(1994) in a RDEU setting.
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values of e) as well as the weight of bad states of the world (low values of e), i.e.
fM (x)  f(x) for x  x and fM (x)  f(x) for x  x where x and x are given real
numbers.
3. If one of the agents denoted by fmaxopt is more optimistic than all the other agents and if
one of the agents denoted by fmaxpess is more pessimistic than all the other agents, then the
representative agent behaves like the most pessimistic individual for low values of e and
behaves like the most optimistic individual for high values of e; i.e. fM +1 fmaxopt and
fM  1 fmaxpess :
By denition, foptf (resp.
fpess
f ) is nondecreasing (resp. nonincreasing). In Proposition 3,
we slightly reinforce these conditions by further assuming that the values of foptf (resp.
fpess
f )
range from zero to innity. Notice that these conditions are satised in the case of lognormal
distributions.
It appears from this proposition that as long as there are optimistic as well as pessimistic
agents in the set I of agents, the representative agent behaves like the individual agents consid-
ered in the behavioral economics and/or psychology literature. Indeed, she puts more weight
on small probability events with large consequences as in the Cumulative Prospect Theory of
Kahneman and Tversky (1992). She has fear (need for security) for very bad events and hope
(desire for potential) for very good events as in the SP/A Theory of Lopes (1987). Everything
works then as if the representative agent distorted the objective distribution of e. In the next
section, we analyze more precisely how this distortion operates.
3.2 The distortion function
Let us rst recall that in the context of Cumulative Prospect Theory, the probability weighting
function is dened as the function that transforms the decumulative objective distribution
function into the decumulative subjective distribution function. This probability weighting
function operates on any prospect. In our framework, we have seen that the representative
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agent distorts the objective distribution of e: In the present section, we will describe this
distortion in terms of a transformation of the decumulative distribution function of e and we
will see that this distortion function has the same shape as the probability weighting function
of the Cumulative Prospect Theory. We will then use the typology introduced by Gonzalez and
Wu (1999) on the probability weighting functions to describe our distortion function and to
relate its characteristics to the individual beliefs of the agents. In particular, we analyze how
shifts in the distribution of individual beliefs impact the distortion function.
With the same notations as in Section 2, we denote by g the distortion function that trans-
forms the objective decumulative distribution function
R1
x f(s)ds into the decumulative distri-
bution function of the group
R1
x f
M (s)ds; i.e. such that g(
R1
x f(s)ds) =
R1
x f
M (s)ds: The next
proposition assumes that there are at least one optimistic and one pessimistic agent in the set
I and characterizes the shape of g under this assumption.
Proposition 4 1. In the lognormal setting with log e Qi N
 
i; 
2

for i = 1; :::; N and if
the set I is made of both optimistic and pessimistic agents then the function g is inverse
S-shaped: concave then convex.
2. In the general setting, if there are at least one optimistic agent fopt and one pessimistic
agent fpess with lim+1
fopt
f = lim 1
fpess
f = +1 and lim 1 foptf = lim+1 fpessf = 0 and
if g is continuously twice di¤erentiable on [0; 1], then g is concave for small probabilities,
and convex for high probabilities.
The function g has then the same shape as the probability weighting function of the Cumu-
lative Prospect Theory. This is in particular illustrated in Figure 3. A variety of methods have
been used to determine the shape of the probability weighting function. Tversky and Kahne-
man (1992), Fox and Tversky (1995) and Prelec (1998) among others specify parametric forms
(respectively ! (p) = p

[p+(1 p) ]1= , ! (p) =
p
[p+(1 p) ]1= and ! (p) = exp  (  log p
)) and
estimate them through standard techniques. Figure 4 permits to show that with a well chosen
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distribution of agentscharacteristics we obtain a distortion function that perfectly ts Prelec
(1998)s function. Wu and Gonzalez (1996, 1998) and Abdellaoui (2000) avoid the potential
problems of parametric estimation and directly derive from experimental studies the shape of
the probability weighting function at the aggregate or individual level. The results of all these
studies are (mostly) consistent with an inverse S-shaped weighting function, concave for small
probabilities, and convex for moderate and high probabilities.
In the lognormal setting, if we denote by i the quantity i =
i 
 ; it is interesting to
remark that the distortion function g only depends on the is and on the relative proportions
is and is independent of  and . In other words, the distortion function only depends on how
much the agents deviate from the objective mean in terms of standard deviation.
3.3 Discriminability, attractiveness and individual agentsbeliefs
Let us analyse how the main features for the shape of the representative agents distortion
function g; for a given aggregate endowment e; are related to the individual characteristics
of the agents in I. Gonzalez and Wu (1999) exhibit two main features for the shape of the
probability weighting function in the context of CPT: diminishing sensitivity and attractiveness.
Attractiveness characterizes the absolute level of the function. Indeed, an inverse S-shaped
function can be completely below the identity line, can cross the identity line at some point
or can be completely above the identity line. Betting on the chance domain is more attractive
when the graph of the probability weighting function graph is more elevated. The denition
of attractiveness is expressed in terms of First Stochastic Dominance (FSD). The probability
weighting function g1 is more attractive than the probability weighting function g2 when the
subjective density f1 dominates the subjective density f2 in the sense of the FSD. In our setting,
we will say that a (representative agents) distortion function g1 associated with a set I1 of agents
is more attractive than a (representative agents) distortion function g2 associated with a set I2
of agents if fMI1 dominates f
M
I2
in the sense of the FSD. Attractiveness of the distortion function
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is related to the level of optimism of the representative agent. In particular, since FSD is
weaker than MLR, a more optimistic representative agent is associated with a more attractive
distortion function.
Let (i) and (
0
i) denote two possible distributions of agentsdensity functions. If the set
(fi)i2I of agentsdensity functions is totally ordered with respect to the FSD order, we will
say that the distribution (0i) dominates the distribution (i) in the sense of the FSD if for any
increasing family (fi) ; we have
P
0ifi <FSD
P
ifi: In other words, the distribution (
0
i) puts
more weight on more attractive distributions. If the set (fi)i2I of agentsdensity functions is
totally ordered with respect to the optimism order <opt; we will say that the distribution (0i)
dominates the distribution (i) in the sense of the MLR if whenever fi <opt fj we have
0i
i
 
0
j
j
:
In other words the ratio between the two densities (0i) and (i) increases with agentsoptimism
and, in particular, the distribution (0i) puts more weight on more optimistic agents.
In the next proposition we analyze the impact of shifts in the distribution of agents char-
acteristics on the attractiveness of the distortion function and on the level of optimism of the
representative agent.
Proposition 5 1. For log-utility functions and in the case of lognormal distributions log e Qi
N  i; 2 for i = 1; :::; N; with the same variance parameter 2, a FSD shift in the dis-
tribution of the means (i) increases attractiveness of the representative agents distortion
function.
2. For log-utility functions and general distributions, if the set (fi)i2I of agentsdensity func-
tions is totally ordered with respect to the FSD order then a FSD shift in the distribution of
agentsdensity functions increases attractiveness of the representative agents distortion
function.
3. For general CARA utility functions and general distributions, if the set (fi)i2I of agents
density functions is totally ordered with respect to the optimism order <opt then a MLR
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dominated shift in the distribution of agentsdensity functions increases attractiveness of
the representative agents distortion function and the level of pessimism of the represen-
tative agent.
When all agents have logarithmic utility functions, attractiveness at the representative agent
level increases with the weight granted to the more attractive density functions. Since FSD is
weaker than MLR, attractiveness at the representative agent level increases with the weight
granted to the more optimistic agents. This is illustrated by Figure 5. As shown in Proposition
5, this last property can be extended to power utility functions if we replace FSD shifts on the
distribution of agentsdensity functions by MLR shifts.
Diminishing sensitivity corresponds to the fact that people become less sensitive to changes
in probability as they move away from a reference point. In the probability domain, the two
endpoints 0 (certainly will not happen) and 1 (certainly will happen) serve as reference points
and under this principle, increments near the endpoints of probability loom larger than incre-
ments near the middle of the scale. This concept is related to the concept of discriminability in
psychophysics literature and can be illustrated by two extreme cases: a function that approaches
a step function and a function that is almost linear.
In our setting we say that a representative agents distortion function g1 associated with a
set I1 of agents exhibits more discriminability than a representative agents distortion function
g2 associated with a set I2 of agents if there exists x 2 [0; 1] such that g1  g2 for x  x and
g1  g2 for x  x: In the next proposition we show that the level of discriminability of the
representative agents distortion function is closely related to the level of disagreement among
agents.
Let us consider as above a family of agents with lognormal distributions lnN (i; 2). We
denote by (i) the support of the distribution of the mean parameter and by (i) the associated
weights. Recall that a mean preserving spread is dened as a modication of the distribution
set (i) on a set of three locations 1 < 2 < 3 with associated increments 1  0; 2  014
and 3  0 such that
P3
i=1 i = 0 and
P3
i=1 ii = 0: A mean preserving spread will be said
symmetric if 1 = 3:
Proposition 6 For log-utility functions and in the case of lognormal distributions log e Qi
N (i; 2), a symmetric mean-preserving spread on the distribution of the means (i) decreases
discriminability of the representative agents distortion function.
Intuitively, this proposition means that when the level of disagreement among agents in-
creases, then the representative agent focuses more on the endpoints of the probability domain
and is less sensitive to probability variations in the middle of the scale. Figure 6 illustrates this
result. It shows, in the setting with two agents, that discriminability decreases with the level of
disagreement. When both agents agree on the objective distribution, the probability weighting
function is linear. When the agents disagree, one of them overestimating the average payo¤ by
twice the standard deviation and the other underestimating it by twice the standard deviation,
we obtain a function that approaches a step function.
4 The Setting with Heterogeneous Time Preference Rates
In this section, we extend our framework in order to take into account the impact of time and
of heterogeneous time preference rates across the agents. Aggregate endowment at a given date
t is described by a random variable et : Agents have di¤erent time preference rates (i) and
di¤erent subjective beliefs Qi: We let M it denote the density at date t of Qi with respect to the
objective probability P and Dit  exp ( it) the discount factor of agent i between date 0 and
date t. As previously, we consider the aggregate utility function U dened as the solution of
the following maximization program
U(et ) = maxP
i2I y
i
t=e

t
X
i2I
iE

M itD
i
tu(y
i
t)

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where (i) are given positive weights. Each agent is then characterized by a beliefM it ; a discount
factor Dit and a weight i:
We will say that the characteristics
 
M it ; D
i
t; i

i2I are independent if for almost all states
of the world !; M it (!) ; D
i
t and i are independent
5 as random variables on I: This property
will be, in particular, satised when I can be written in the form I = J  K  L and when
there exist characteristics

M jt

j2J
;
 
Dkt

k2K and
 
`

`2L such that for i = (j; k; `) we have 
M it ; D
i
t; i

=

M jt ;
Dkt ;
`

: Roughly speaking, this property means that there is no specic
correlation between beliefs and time preferences and that the weights granted by the social
planner to the individuals in the economy are independent of their time and belief characteristics.
This condition is, in particular, satised when beliefs and time preferences are independent
and when the agents are uniformly weighted in the social welfare function. This is also the case
when the agentsweights are given by their relative wealth and when wealth, beliefs and time
preferences are independent.
Assuming uniform weights is quite reasonable since there is no particular reason for the
social planner to favor one agent with respect to another agent. The independence of beliefs
and time preference rates is more disputable. They may be positively as well as negatively
correlated, the independence condition may then be analyzed as a central scenario.
We easily obtain the following analog of Proposition 1 in the framework with heterogeneous
time preference rates.
Proposition 7 If the characteristics
 
M it ; D
i
t; i

i2I are independent, then the aggregate utility
for consumption is given by
U(et ) = E [MtDtu(e

t )]
5More precisely, for any real valued (measurable) functions f; g; h dened on the real line, we have
1
jIj
X
i2I
f
 
M it

g
 
Dit

h (i) =
 
1
jIj
X
i2I
f
 
M it
! 
1
jIj
X
i2I
g
 
Dit
! 
1
jIj
X
i2I
h (i)
!
a.e.
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with
Mt =
 
1
jIj
X
i2I
 
M it
! 1
and Dt =
 
1
jIj
X
i2I
 
Dit
! 1
:
The representative agent belief is then given by Mt =

1
jIj
P
i2I
 
M it
 1 and the representative
agent time discount factor is given by Dt =

1
jIj
P
i2I
 
Dit
 1
:
This means that all the properties established in the previous section on the belief of the
representative agent remain valid.
The properties of the representative agent time preference rate are easy to obtain. Note
that the properties of a consensus time preference rate when there is heterogeneity on the
individual time preference rates (and not on the beliefs) have already been studied in varying
contexts. Indeed, the problem of the aggregation of the utility discount rates has been studied by
Reinschmidt (2002) through a certainty equivalent approach, by Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005)
and Nocetti and al. (2008) through a Benthamite/Pareto optimal approach, and by Lengwiler
(2005) through an equilibrium approach. All these papers adopt a deterministic setting with no
divergence on the beliefs of the agents. On the contrary our aim here is to derive the properties
at the aggregate level simultaneously on the beliefs and on the time preference rate (and in a
quite general stochastic setting).
We know that the representative agent time discount factor is given byDt =
P
i2I
1
jIj
 
Dit
 1
where Dit  exp ( it) : We introduce the representative agent marginal time preference rate
m as well as the representative agent average time preference rate a; respectively dened by
Dm (t)   
D0t
Dt
and Da (t)   
1
t
logDt:
The average discount rate corresponds to the rate which, if applied constantly for all in-
tervening years, would yield the discount factor Dt; whereas the marginal discount rate is the
rate of change of the discount factor. It is easy to recover the average discount rate from the
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marginal discount rate since a (t) =
1
t
R t
0 m (s) ds:
Let us state the following properties of the average and marginal time preference rates.
Proposition 8 Properties of the representative agent time preference rate
1. The representative agent average and marginal time preference rates are given by
Da (t) =  
1
t
log
"
1
N
NX
i=1
exp ( it)
#1=
;
Dm (t) =
NX
i=1
exp ( it)PN
i=1 exp ( it)
i:
2. The representative agent time preference rates are lower than the average of the time
preference rates, i.e.
Dm (t) 
1
N
NX
i=1
i = 
D
m (0) and 
D
a (t) 
1
N
NX
i=1
i = 
D
a (0)
with strict inequalities when i 6= j for some (i; j) in I.
3. Behavioral Properties : The representative agent time preference rates are decreasing
with time. Moreover, the asymptotic discount rates are given by the lowest time preference
rate, i.e. limt!+1 Da (t) = limt!+1 Dm (t) = infi (i) : The representative agent behaves
for t large enough like the most patient agent.
These formulas permit explicit computations for specic distributions of the individual time
preference rates. For instance, if we assume a Gamma 6 distribution (; ) for the is we
obtain
Dm (t) =
m2
m+ v2t
6As mentioned in Section 2, sums should be replaced by integrals when dealing with continuous distributions.
The density function of a gamma distribution  (; ) is given by 

 ()
x 1 exp( x): Its mean m and its variance
v2 are respectively given by m = 

and v2 = 
2
:
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where m and v2 respectively denote the mean and the variance of the considered distribution.
It is immediate on this simple example that the marginal discount rate decreases with time and
is hyperbolic as in Weitzman (1998, 2001). Furthermore, the speed of the decrease increases
with the level of heterogeneity v2 as well as with the level of risk tolerance.
The next proposition provides comparative statics results for shifts in the distribution f of
the individual time preference rates:
Proposition 9 1. A FSD (resp. SSD) dominated shift in the distribution f of individual
time preference rates decreases the representative agent average time preference rate Da :
2. A MLR (resp. PD) dominated shift in the distribution f of individual time preference
rates decreases the representative agent marginal time preference rate Dm:
Second Stochastic Dominance as well as Portfolio Dominance are related to a notion of risk
or of dispersion while First Stochastic Dominance and Monotone Likelihood Ratio Dominance
are related to notions of shifts from low values to high values. Roughly speaking, Proposition 9
introduces the right concepts of dispersion and shifts and shows that more dispersion in agents
time preference rates as well as shifts to lower values of individual time preference rates decrease
the representative agents time preference rate.
5 Applications
We have seen that starting from a standard model with optimistic as well as pessimistic vNM
and exponential discounting agents, we obtain, at the representative agent level, properties
such as an inverse S-shaped distortion function and hyperbolic discounting, that are in line
with recent empirical and experimental results. A possible interpretation of such a result is to
consider that each individual subject to experiments behaves as a group of individuals at the
equilibrium. This provides us with a possible representation of the brain as an organization
with a social planner and heterogeneous doers. Some doers are overoptimistic while others are
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overpessimistic. Similarly, some doers are impatient while others are more patient. Such an
approach is in the same spirit as Brocas and Carillo (2008) where the authors divide the brain
into two systems: an impulsive/myopic one and a cognitive/forward-looking one. However,
while Brocas and Carillo (2008) model mainly relies on information asymmetries and principal-
agent models, our model relies on decentralization and optimal allocation approaches. Such a
decomposition of the brain into di¤erent systems that are possibly in conict are based on recent
neuroscience and psychology evidences (see Cohen, 2005) related to intrapersonal tensions:
temporal horizon conicts, information conicts (that may lead to information asymmetries as
in Brocas and Carillo, 2008, but also to information diversity and beliefs heterogeneity as in
our model) or utility evaluation conicts. In economics, such decompositions have been rst
considered by Thaler and Shefrin (1981) and Shefrin and Thaler (1988).
5.1 Noisy Beliefs and Cumulative Prospect Theory
In this section we show that an individual who evaluates lotteries through the social welfare
function associated with a collection of agents (neural systems or brain areas), each of them
with specic noisy beliefs, is a CPT agent in the sense that she distorts the distribution of the
lotteries through an inverse S-shaped weighting function (commpon to all lotteries).
We start by considereing normal distributions. Let us consider an individual who when facing
a lottery whose payo¤ x is described by a normal distribution N (; 2) passes this information
for evaluation to separate systems. Each system i has a subjective belief Qi under which x
has a normal distribution N  + i; 2 : The parameter i is xed independently of x and
characterizes the system i. It might result from noise in the information transmission. In that
case there is no specic reason for the average perceived signal to be biased and we should haveP
i = 0. It might also result from a specialization of the di¤erent systems, some systems being
optimistic, i.e., i > 0 and others being pessimistic, i.e., i < 0: We assume that the individual
acts like a central planner looking for a Pareto optimal decomposition of the payo¤s from the
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lottery among the systems and evaluates the lottery through the social welfare function, i.e.,
U(x) = maxP
xi=x
X
i
iE
Qi

u(xi)

(2)
where the parameters i are the weights granted to the systems by the central planner or the
distribution of the is.
Proposition 10 Consider an individual who evaluates any lottery x in the space X of lotteries
with normal payo¤s through U(x):
1. The individual is a CPT agent over the space X in the sense that there exists a probability
weighting function g such that, for all lotteries x in X with density fx we have U(x) =R
fx;(s)u (s) ds where g(
R1
t fx(s)ds) =
R1
t fx;(s)ds:
2. If there exist at least one optimistic and one pessimistic system, then g is inverse S-
shaped.
3. A MLR shift on the distribution of the is increases attractiveness of the probability weight-
ing function g.
This means that a Pareto optimal decomposition leads to an overall (representative agent)
evaluation that corresponds to the valuation that would be provided by a behavioral agent.
The level of discriminability would then be directly related to the level of noise as illustrated in
Proposition 6 in the case of log utility functions. The level of attractiveness would be associated
to the level of systematic bias (if any) as a direct corollary of Proposition 5.
The behavior of the individual and the denition of the social welfare function U can be
naturally generalized to any lottery whose payo¤ is a function of a normal distribution. Indeed,
consider a lottery whose payo¤ is of the form v = '(x) where x is normally distributed as above
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and where ' is a Borelian function. We may dene U(v) by
U(v) = maxP
vi=v
X
i
iE
Qi

u(vi)

where the Qis and the is are the same as for x.
The following result extends the result of Proposition 10 to general lotteries. It relies on
the fact that any random variable is distributed as a function of a given normally distributed
variable.
Proposition 11 Consider an individual who evaluates through U any lottery v = '(x) where
x is normally distributed and whose preferences over the set of all possible lotteries only depend
on the distribution of the lottery under consideration. The individual is a CPT agent over the
space of all possible lotteries in the sense that her preferences can be represented by the utility
function U extended to the space of all possible lotteries and there exists a probability weighting
function g such that, for all lottery v with density fv we have U(v) =
R
fv;(s)u (s) ds where
g(
R1
t fv(s)ds) =
R1
t fv;(s)ds:
This corollary provides then the following possible interpretation of CPT: the result of a pos-
sibly noisy transmission of the objective distribution to separate (specialized) systems (neural
systems or brain areas), the overall evaluation resulting from a social welfare function applied
to these systems. The construction of the Qis in the general case is very similar to their con-
struction in the normal case. The resulting global behavior might then be associated intuitively
with a possible behavior of the systems that consists in describing any random variable in terms
of Gaussian distributions. For instance, a random variable that takes values 0 and 1 with prob-
ability 1/2 may be described as a random variable that takes value 1 when a given Gaussian
variable N (0; 1) is positive and that takes value 0 when the Gaussian variable is negative. The
process i will then transform this binomial distribution into a binomial distribution that is equal
to 1 when a Gaussian variable N (i; 1) is positive -or equivalently when a Gaussian variable22
N (0; 1) is smaller than i- and is equal to 0 when the Gaussian variable N (i; 1) is negative.
5.2 Heterogeneous Beliefs and Ambiguity aversion
In this section, we show that an individual who evaluates ambiguous lotteries through the
social welfare function associated with a collection of agents, each of them being endowed with
a plausible probability, may be ambiguity averse.
Let us consider an individual facing a lottery whose payo¤ x has an ambiguous distribution.
The ambiguity of the lottery is characterized by a set of plausible distributions with a set of
associated probabilities x = (Qx1 ; :::; Q
x
n). We assume that the agent passes the information
to di¤erent systems (neural systems or brain areas), each endowed with one of the plausible
distributions, in order to evaluate this lottery. We assume that the individual acts like a central
planner looking for a Pareto optimal decomposition of the gains/losses from the lottery among
the di¤erent processes and evaluates the lottery through the social welfare function, i.e.,
U(x) = maxP
xi=x
X
i2I
EQ
x
i

u(xi)

:
We assume that the common utility function is given by u(x) = x
1  1
1  1
with  < 1:
Consider rst the classical Ellsberg 3-color urn problem. An urn contains 30 red balls
and 60 black and yellow balls in unspecied proportion. A lottery A that pays $100 if a red
ball is drawn is evaluated at U (A) = 13u (100) : Since the probability for one black ball to
be drawn is unknown, and if all possible probabilities of the form i90 for i = 0; :::; 60; are
considered as equally plausible, a lottery B that pays $100 if a black ball is drawn is evaluated
at U (B) =

1
61
P60
i=0
 
i
90
 1
u (100) . It is easy to check that

1
61
P60
i=0
 
i
90
 1
< 13 for  < 1
and our individual prefers lottery A to lottery B. Now, the same individual evaluates the lottery
C that pays $100 if a red or a yellow ball is drawn at U (C) =

1
61
P60
i=0
 
30+i
90
 1
u (100) . The
lottery D that pays $100 if a black or a yellow ball is drawn is evaluated at U (D) = 23u (100).
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Such an individual prefers lottery D to lottery C. As in Ellsberg paradox, Savages independence
axiom is violated, even though each process is an expected utility maximizer and satises the
independence axiom. The individual exhibits ambiguity aversion. In order to generalize this
result let us recall the following denitions adapted to our setting from Schmeidler7 (1989).
Denition 2 An ambiguous lottery
 
x; (Qxi )i2I

is dened by a random variable x, whose values
(x (!))!2
 represent the set of possible outcomes and by a set (Q
x
i )i2I of plausible probabilities
over 
.
Denition 3 If

x;

Q1;xi

i2I

and

x;

Q2;xi

i2I

are two ambiguous lotteries associated to
the same random variable x, the even mixture of these ambiguous lotteries is the ambiguous
lottery

x;

1
2Q
1;x
i +
1
2Q
2;x
i

i2I

:
Denition 4 An agent is called ambiguity averse if she prefers the even mixture of two am-
biguous lotteries that she values equally to either of the two lotteries.
Proposition 12 When  < 1; an individual who evaluates ambiguous lotteries through the
social welfare function associated to a collection of agents each of them being endowed with one
of the plausible probabilities is ambiguity averse.
We have considered as equally plausible all probabilities associated to a given ambiguous
lottery. Our results can be generalized to the setting where the individual, based on his sub-
jective information, associates a probability distribution (qi)i2I over the set (Qxi )i2I where qi
 0 is the subjective probability that Qxi be the probability associated to the true distribution
of the lottery payo¤s. In such a setting, the qis might be integrated in the individual overall
utility function as the weights in the social welfare function, i.e.
U(x) = maxP
xi=x
X
i2I
qiE
Qxi

u(xi)

:
7See also Ghirardato (2004).
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5.3 Dynamic setting
We have until now only considered a two dates setting even though we have considered di¤erent
possible time horizons for the second date. It is useful to understand how our model might be
embedded in a dynamic setting.
Consider as in nancial models a di¤usion setting:We denote by W a Brownian motion and
we assume that e follows the following stochastic di¤erential equation with constant parameters
det =
 
+ 12
2

etdt+ etdWt. The distribution of et is then, for all t; lognormal of the form
log et  N (t; 2t):
Let us rst assume as in Section 5.1 that agents deviation from the objective mean is
constant in terms of standard deviation, i.e., that the subjective distributions are of the form
logN (it; 2t) with it = t + i
p
t: Following Proposition 10, there exists a probability
weighting function g that distorts the objective distribution into the distribution of the group.
This function is independent of t and the behavior of the group is then consistent across time.
Let us now consider the case where beliefs heterogeneity results from ambiguity. Di¤erent
probabilities are considered as plausible and each agent is endowed with one of them. In our
di¤usion setting, let us consider the simplest case where each probability is dened by its density
dMi = iMidW where the is are constant. Following Girsanov Theorem, the distribution of
log et from agent i point of view is given by N (it; 2t) with it = (  122)t+ it: As seen in
Example 1, the ex-ante variance of log et from the representative agent point of view is given by
V arM [log et ]) = V ar [log et ] + V ari
 
it

= 2t + 2t2V ari
i: The long term ex-ante variance
from the representative agent point of view, is then higher than the objective variance and their
ratio converges to innity.
It is interesting to note that, even though the di¤erent agents do not learn and continue
to believe in a constant drift i = (   122) + i; the group as a whole learns and the drift
anticipated by the group converges to the objective drift as long as the objective probability lies
in the initial set of plausible probabilities, i.e. as long as we have i = 0 for some i. This point
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can be easily checked in the log utility setting where the representative agent probability is
given byM = 1jIj
P
Mi and satises dM = MMdW with M =
P
iMiP
Mi
: By Girsanov Theorem,
the date-t drift anticipated by the representative agent is then given by i = (  122) + M
which converges almost surely to the objective drift (  122).
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Proof of Proposition 1
At the Pareto optimum, we have
iM
iu0(yi) = q
for some random variable q: It follows that
yi =

q
iM i
 
hence
e =
X
i2I

q
iM i
 
= q 
X
i2I

1
iM i
 
and
yi = e

iM
i
P
i2I [iM i]
 :
We have then
X
i2I
iE

M iu(yi)

=
X
i2I
iE
24M i iM i 1 P
i2I [iM i]
1  1 u(e)
35
= E
24 Pi2I iM i P
i2I [iM i]
1  1 u(e)
35
= E
24"X
i2I

iM
i
#1=
u(e)
35
and U (e) = E [Mu(e)] with M =
P
i2I 

i
 
M i
1=.
Proof of Corollary 2
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We have
E [Mh (e)] = E
24 X
i2I
i
 
M i
!1=
h (e)
35
= E
24 X
i2I
i

f i
f
(e)
!1=
h (e)
35
= E
" P
i2I i
 
f i (e)
1=
f (e)
h (e)
#
=
Z  P
i2I i
 
f i (x)
1=
f (x)
h (x) f (x) dx
=
Z  X
i2I
i
 
f i (x)
!1=
h (x) dx
hence fM =
 P
i2I i (fi)
1= :
Proofs for Example 2
1. Proof that the distribution of log e is bimodal for j1   2j > 2=p and uni-
modal for j1   2j  2=p: We have

f log

=
1
2

f log1

+
1
2

f log2

=
1
2
p
2
exp
 
  (x  1)
2
22
!
+
1
2
p
2
exp
 
  (x  2)
2
22
!
:
This function has either two maxima that are symmetric with respect to 1+22 or only
one maximum at 1+22 : In the rst case
1+2
2 would be a local minimum. It su¢ ces
then to analyse the sign of the second derivative of
 
f log

at 1+22 : We obtain that the
distribution is bimodal for j1   2j > 2=p and unimodal for j1   2j  2=p:
2. Proof that for  = 1+22 the distribution of log e
 is portfolio dominated by
the objective distribution. The ratio between the density of log e under Q and the
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density of log e under P is given by
fM log
f log
(x) =

1
2
exp


 2 (x  ) (  1) + 2   21
22

+
1
2
exp


 2x(  2) + 2   22
22
 1

which is clearly symmetric with respect to , decreasing before  and increasing after :
Moreover, since the distributions of log e under Q and under P are both symmetric with
respect to , we have EQ [log e] = EP [log e] = : These properties give V arQ [log e] >
V arP [log e] (see Jouini and Napp, 2008).
3. Proof that for general (i) ; V arQ [log e] > V arP [log e] : For general (i), fM log
is symmetric with respect to 1+22 which gives E
Q [log e] = 1+22 : Furthermore, we
may apply the same reasoning as in 2. to compare the distribution of log e under Q
with the distribution whose density is given by 1p
2
exp 

x 1+2
2
2
22
: We then have
V arQ [log e] > 2 = V arP [log e] :
4. Proof that a higher level of risk tolerance induces a Portfolio Dominated shift
in the representative agent distribution. For two di¤erent values  and 0 of the risk
tolerance parameter; it su¢ ces to consider
fM log
0
fM log
and to apply the same reasoning as in 2.
Proof of Proposition 3
1. If lim1
fopt
f = lim 1
fpess
f = 1 and lim 1 foptf = lim1 fpessf = 0 then the representa-
tive agent density function is such that lim 1 fMf = lim1
fM
f = 1 and fMf can not be
monotone.
2. This is immediate according to lim 1 fMf = lim1
fM
f =1:
3. It su¢ ces to remark that fM = fmaxopt

maxopt +
P
i=1;:::;N
i6=opt

fi
fmaxopt
1=
: If fifmaxopt is nonin-
creasing for all i then

maxopt +
P
i=1;:::;N
i6=opt

fi
fmaxopt
1=
is bounded away from 0 and 1 in
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the neighborhood of1 and we have fM 1 fmaxopt : The result at the neighborhood of  1
is obtained similarly.
Proof of Proposition 4
1. Let g be given by
R1
u fM (x)dx = g
R1
u f(x)dx

: We have fM (x) = g0
R1
u f(x)dx

f (u)
and g0
R1
u f(x)dx

= fMf (u) : We also have  f(u)g00
R1
u f(x)dx

=

fM
f
0
(u) which
gives that the concavity of g is governed by the sign of

fM
f
0
: Remark that

fM
f
0
is
negative in a neighborhood of  1 and then that g00 is positive and g is convex in a
neighborhood of 1. Similarly, we have that

fM
f
0
is positive in a neighborhood of 1
and then that g00 is negative and g is concave in a neighborhood of 1 : Finally,

fM
f
0
is a
combination of exponentials where the decreasing exponentials have a negative weight and
the increasing exponentials have a positive weight. The function

fM
f
0
is then increasing.
The function g is then inverse S-shaped: concave then convex.
2. Since g0
R1
u f(x)dx

= fMf (u), we have g
0(0) = fMf (1) =1: If g00(0) is well dened, we
have g00(0) < 0 and hence g00(x) < 0 in a neighborhood of 0: The probability weighting
function is then concave for small probabilities. The result in the neighborhood of 1 is
obtained similarly.
Proof of Proposition 5
1. Let us consider a distribution of the means that is described by a density function
h . The associated representative agent cumulative distribution function is given by
1p
22
R
dh ()
R x
 1 exp  (s )
2
22
ds: Since the function  ! R x 1 exp  (s )222 ds is decreas-
ing a FSD shift of h decreases the value of
R
dh ()
R x
 1 exp  (s )
2
22
ds and leads then to
a FSD dominating distribution function for the representative agent.
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2. Let us consider a distribution (0i) and a FSD dominated shift (i). We want to prove
that
P
0iFi 
P
iFi: For a given x; letting xi denote the quantity Fi(x), it su¢ ces to
prove that
P
0ixi 
P
ixi for a nondecreasing family (xi)i2I which is true since (0i)
dominates (i) in the sense of the FSD.
3. Let us consider a distribution (0i) and a MLR dominated shift (i). It su¢ ces to prove
that (
P
0if

i )
1

(
P
if

i )
1

is increasing or that
P
0iGiP
iGi
is increasing with Gi = f

i . Without any loss
of generality, we may assume that all the considered functions are di¤erentiable and let
us consider the derivative of
P
0iGiP
iGi
P
0iGiP
iGi
0
=
(
P
0iG
0
i) (
P
iGi)  (
P
0iGi) (
P
iG
0
i)
(
P
iGi)
2
=
P
fifj ij

0i
i
  
0
j
j

G0iGj  GiG0j

(
P
iGi)
2 :
Remark that for fi  fj we have Gi  Gj and then G0iGj   GiG0j  0: Furthermore, for
fi  fj we also have 
0
i
i
  
0
j
j
 0 which leads to the conclusion.
Proof of Proposition 6
It is immediate that 1; 2; and 3 can be written in the form 2   h; 2; 2 + h for
some h > 0: For the distribution of individual characteristics (i) ; the representative agent
distribution function is given by 1p
22
P
i i
R x
 1 exp  (s i)
2
22
ds: The symmetric mean pre-
serving spread induces a modication of this distribution that is positively proportional to
1p
22
(
R x
 1 exp

  (s 2+h)2
22

  2 exp

  (s 2)2
22

+ exp

  (s 2 h)2
22

)ds: Simple computations
permit to show that this modication is positive for x  2 and negative for x  2: A sym-
metric mean preserving spread leads then to a distribution function that is above (resp. below)
the original distribution function below a given threshold. We have then an increase of the level
of discriminability.
Proof of Proposition 7
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Replacing M i by M iDi in the proof of Proposition 1, we easily get that
U (et ) =
"X
i2I

iM
i
tD
i
t
#1=
:
Now, if the characteristics
 
i;M
i
t ; D
i
t

are independent, then
"X
i2I

iM
i
tD
i
t
#1=
=
" 
1
jIj
X
i2I
 
M it
!#1= " 1
jIj
X
i2I
 
Dit
!#1=
and
X
i2I
iE

M itD
i
tu(y
i
t)

= E
24 1
jIj
X
i2I
 
M it
!1=  1
jIj
X
i2I
 
Dit
!1=
u(et )
35 :
Proof of Proposition 8
We prove the proposition for Dm since it is easy to check that all the derived properties are
inherited by Da (t) =
1
t
R t
0 
D
m (s) ds:
1. Immediate.
2. The representative agent time preference rate Dm (t) =
PN
i=1
exp( it)PN
i=1 exp( it)
i is an average
of the is with weights that decrease with i: Such an average is smaller than the equally
weighted average.
3. Denote i = exp ( it). We have d
D
m(t)
dt =  
P
i2I i
2
iP
i2I i
 
P
i2I iiP
i2I i
2
which is nega-
tive.
We have Dm (t) =
inf+
PN
i6=inf exp( (i inf)t)i
1+
PN
i6=inf exp( (i inf)t)
and exp ( (i   inf)t) i !1 0 we have then
Dm (t)! inf :
Proof of Proposition 9
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The proof of 1. is inspired from Jouini and Napp (2008) and the proof of 2. is inspired from
Nocetti et al. (2008).
1. We have
Da (t)   
1
t
lnE [exp ( t)]
where E is the expectation operator associated with the distribution of (i). For a given
t; the function ! exp ( t) is decreasing (and convex) and, by denition, a FSD (resp.
SSD) shift in the distribution of (i) decreases the value of E [exp ( t)] and increases
Da (t) :
2. We have then
Dm (t) =
E [ exp ( t)]
E [exp ( t)] :
where E is the expectation operator associated with the distribution of (i) :
Let us now consider P 1 and P 2; two distributions such that P 2 MLR P 1: By denition,
the density  = dP
2
dP 1
is nondecreasing in  (in other words i ! i and i ! i are
comonotonic). We have then, E
P2 [ exp( t)]
EP
2 [exp( t)] =
EP
1
[ exp( t)]
EP
1 [ exp( t)] =
EQ[]
EQ[]
where Q is
dened by a density with respect to P 1 equal (up to a constant) to exp ( t) : Since 
is nondecreasing in  , we have
EQ []  EQ []EQ [] ;
hence
EP
2
[ exp ( t)]
EP 2 [exp ( t)]  E
Q [] ;
 E
P 1 [ exp ( t)]
EP 1 [exp ( t)] :
Let us assume now that P 2 PD P 1 and let us consider D;P
2
m (t) and 
D;P 1
m (t) the35
associated representative agent time preference rates: We have D;P
2
m (t) =
EP
2
[ exp( t)]
EP2 [exp( t)]
and then EP
2
h
u0()(  D;P 2m )
i
= 0 with u() =   exp( t): By denition, this implies
EP
1
h
u0()(  D;P 2m )
i
 0 hence D;P 2m  D;P
1
m :
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Proof of Proposition 10 1. Let x 2 X with x  N  ; 2 : We have x Qi N  + i; 2 :
From Proposition 1, there exists Q such that U(x) = EQ [x] and the density of x under Q
is given by fx; (s) =
h
1
n
PN
i=1 (fx;i)

i1=
where fx;i is the density of x under Qi: We then
have U(x) =
R
fx;(s)u (s) ds: It su¢ ces to prove that
R1
t fx;(s)ds is a function of
R1
t fx(s)ds
that does not depend on x; i.e. that does not depend upon  and : Let g be the function
dened by g

1p
2
R1
t exp

 x22

ds

=
R1
t
h
1
n
PN
i=1

1p
2
exp

  (x i)22
i1=
ds for all t:
The function g is completely dened on [0; 1] and by a simple change of variables, we have
g

1p
2
R1
t exp

  (x )2
22

ds

=
R1
t
h
1
n
PN
i=1

1p
2
exp

  (x i )2
22
i1=
ds for all t and
we then have
R1
t fx;(s)ds = g
 R1
t fx(s)ds

:
2. The function g is the same as in Proposition 4.
3. Direct application of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 11
Let v such that v = '(x) where x is normally distributed. By denition, we have U(v) =
supP vi EQi [u(vi)]. We denote by f iv the density of v with respect to Qi: By Proposition 1 and
Corollary 2, we have U(v) =
R
fv;(s)u (s) ds with fv; =
 P 
f iv
 1 : We clearly have fv; =
'0fx;  ' and f iv = '0f ix  ' and since
R1
t fx;(s)ds =
R1
t
 P 
f ix
 1 (s)ds = g  R1t fx(s)ds ;
a simple change of variable leads to
R1
t fv;(s)ds = g
 R1
t fv(s)ds

: We have then the result
over the set of transformations of normal distributions.
Let us consider now a random variable v and a normally distributed random variable x:We
know that v has the same distribution as F 1v [Fx(x)] where F 1v (p) is dened by F 1v (p) =
inf ft : Fv(t)  pg : If the individual has preferences that only depend on the distribution, it
su¢ ces to set U(v) = U('(x)) with ' = F 1v  Fx which is perfectly dened. We then have
U(x) =
R1
t f'(x);(s)u(s)ds with
R1
t f'(x);(s)ds = g
 R1
t f'(x)(s)ds

and since v is distributed
like '(x); we have
R1
t f'(x);(s)ds = g
 R1
t fv(s)ds

; and the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 12
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Let us consider

x;

Q1;xi

i2I

and

x;

Q2;xi

i2I

two lotteries that our agent values equally.
For all i in I; let us denote byM1i andM
2
i the densities respectively associated to Q
1;x
i and Q
2;x
i :
We have E
h P
i2IM

i
 1
 u(x)
i
= E
h P
i2I N

i
 1
 u(x)
i
: For   1; we have  Pi2I  12Mi + 12Ni 1 
1
2
 P
i2I (M

i )
 1
 + 12
 P
i2I (N

i )
 1
 which gives E
 P
i2I
 
1
2Mi +
1
2Ni
 1 u(x)  E h Pi2IMi  1 u(x)i :
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Figure 1: In this gure, we have represented in black the consensus belief in a log-utility agents
setting. A proportion of 47% of the agents believe that log e  N (0; 1) and the remaining 53%
believe that log e  N (2:5; 1): The beliefs of these two categories of agents are represented in
grey.
Figure 2: In this gure we represent the consensus belief for 3 di¤erent levels of risk aversion.
We assume that a proportion of 47% of the agents believe that log e  N (0; 1) and the remaining
53% believe that log e  N (2:5; 1): The upper curve corresponds to  = 2; the lower curve to
 = 0:8 and the middle curve to  = 1: An increase of  increases the distance between the
peaks and their size.
Figure 3: In this gure we represent in black the representative agent probability weighting
function in a model with two logarithmic utility agents. One of them overestimates the ob-
jective mean by one standard deviation and the other one underestimates it by one standard
deviation. We also represent in grey the individual probability weighting functions (the concave
one corresponds to the optimistic agent).
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Figure 4: In this gure we represent Prelecs function exp( (  ln p)) with  = 0:73 that cor-
responds to a standard specication. We also represent the probability weighting function
corresponding to a model with two log-utility agents. The rst one underestimates the ob-
jective average by 120% of the standard deviation and has a weight of 30%. The second one
overestimates the objective average by 60% of the standard deviation and has a weight of 70%.
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Figure 5: In this gure we represent the probability weighting function of the representative
agent in a model with logarithmic utility agents. In the upper curve curve the optimistic and
the pessimistic agents are equally weighted. In the lower curve, the pessimistic agents have
a 60% weight and the optimistic ones have a 40% weight. Attractiveness decreases with the
weight granted to the pessimistic agents.
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Figure 6: The probability weighting function for di¤erent levels of divergence of belief. Both
agents agree on a normal distribution but one of them overestimates the objective mean by 
times the standard deviation while the other one underestimates it by  times the standard
deviation. The value of  ranges from 0 to 2. The discriminability decreases with  (in other
words the curvature increases with ).
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